ABSTRACT In politics ÒsoftÓ ideational factors are often dismissed in favor of ÒhardÓ quantifiable data. Since the Òmemory boom,Ó however, collective memory has become an important variable for explaining persistent grievances and cycles of hatred. Building on the work of Hannah Arendt and the first generation of the Frankfurt School, I seek to counterbalance the literatureÕs predominantly negative conception of memory by developing a constructive understanding of remembrance as a resource for rethinking politics in the aftermath of breaks in the narrative thread of historical time. My basic thesis is that historical ruptures shared by an entire generation can activate collective memory as a resource for reimagining political life. I show how Arendt and the critical theorists of the early Frankfurt School used the caesura of 1945 to rethink the meaning of the past and endorse new forms of political life in the aftermath of EuropeÕs age of total war.
Introduction
In politics ÒsoftÓ ideational factors are often dismissed in favor of ÒhardÓ quantifiable data. Since the Òmemory boom,Ó however, collective memory has become an important variable for explaining persistent historical grievances. For example, while it is possible to understand the Eurozone crisis using quantifiable variables, this approach cannot explain why Ò[h]ardly a day goes by without [German] Chancellor Angela Merkel being depicted in a Nazi uniformÓ (Fleischhauer, 2012) or why many Greeks see the crisis as a German attempt to Òoccupy Greece through the economyÓ (Norris, 2011) . While material factors are important, their meaning is determined by references to narratives about the past.
These frameworks of remembrance influence contemporary events by shaping the historic analogies that help individuals to interpret and understand the present (Khong, 1992) .
Unfortunately, collective memory can also turn the past into a Weberian Òiron cageÓ (stahlhartes GehŠuse). If every choice can be tied to a past trigger, then individuals are caught in never-ending causal chains. These considerations have led many scholars to focus on the Òsins of memoryÓ (Schacter, 2001 ) and on how past grievances drive recurring Òcycles of hatredÓ (Minow, 2002) .
I seek to supplement this predominant ÒnegativeÓ reading with a more Òpositive,Ó constructive interpretation of collective memory as a resource for social and political transformation (Kšnig, 2008: 23-31 However, experiences that force individuals to question the underlying structures of society create a rupture in existing narratives. By breaking causal chains, such disruptions make Òparadigm shiftsÓ possible (Kuhn 1962) , allowing the past to be reconstructed in new ways. 
Memory and Rupture in Postwar German Thought
It is somewhat counterintuitive to seek a constructive reading of memory in postwar German social and political theory. However, the firsthand experience of violence and atrocity forced intellectuals like Arendt, Benjamin, Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse to consider how a past that included two World Wars and the death chambers at Auschwitz could be used to build a better future, instead of merely repeating the horrors of the past. My use of these thinkers of Òdark timesÓ (Benhabib et al., 2010) is not meant to deny their deep philosophical Ð and in the case of Arendt and Adorno, deeply personal (Rensmann 2012) Ð disagreements. Since their work spans a range of topics and methods, this divergence is 4 hardly surprising. What is important for my argument is that in the aftermath of EuropeÕs age of total war these theorists agreed on the need to harness memory for constructive ends.
The common thread running through their thought is a philosophical orientation defined by fear, i.e. of the need to avoid the evil that haunted Europe at the beginning of the twentieth century (Forst, 2013: 166) . Not only were Arendt and the first generation of the Frankfurt School driven by the trauma of what they had witnessed; Òtheir reaction to the catastrophe of the twentieth century was a political as opposed to a theological or a merely philosophical oneÓ (Benhabib, 2011: 22) . As a result, they all sought to stop the recurring cycles of violence in Europe by identifying how memory could fit into an emancipatory social and political theory.
Although their lived experience was defined by catastrophe, none of these thinkers were overcome by their orientation to the summum malum (Shklar, 1998: 11 (Benhabib, 2003: xliv) . After BenjaminÕs death these thinkers all took up his anamnestic form of Òredemptive criticismÓ (Habermas, 1979: 30-59) , which focused on saving the treasures of the past in order to reappropriate them for a different future.
The idea of crisis plays a crucial role in BenjaminÕs historiography. He argues that it is only in moments of profound dislocation, when events can no longer be subsumed into existing narratives, that submerged pearls from the past can be retrieved for the present.
Building on this insight, Arendt and the Frankfurt School argued that such ÒBenjaminian momentsÓ (Benhabib, 2012: 32-3) could break the seemingly inevitable link between the past and the present, rekindling hope for the future. This shared emphasis makes this constellation of thinkers fruitful for developing my positive understanding of memory in the aftermath of historical ruptures.
A brief disclaimer regarding my interpretation of Arendt and the first generation of the Frankfurt School: my goal is neither full hermeneutic fidelity to their respective philosophical projects nor completeness as regards their theoretical differences. I merely draw on the work of these postwar German theorists to inspire a constructive understanding of the creative potential of memory in the aftermath of profound societal ruptures. In doing so, I uncover and draw attention to an interesting and often overlooked overlap in their otherwise divergent approaches to social and political theory.
Individual and Collective Memory
The social pressure to be a unique individual is one of the key markers of modernity. In traditional societies identity is determined by social position and family background. In the modern process of individuation, the autonomous actions of human beings are crucial to the maintenance of a coherent identity. These choices are rooted in the decisions of individuals, who maintain their identities by appropriating their actions and carrying them into the future.
Since past decisions determine individuality in the present, the concept of life history takes on a central role (Kierkegaard, 1987: 216) . These histories are preserved in memory. As a result, remembrance becomes Òan essential element of the finite historical being of manÓ (Gadamer, 2004: 14) .
Memory is neither history, nor is it defined by the chronology of linear time. The concept of history comes from the Greek historia (ἱστορία), meaning inquiry or knowledge acquired by investigation. Whereas history is defined by the study of archival texts and 6 objects, memory comes Òfrom within.Ó It is an affective connection, Òa felt knowledge of recent eventsÓ (Kateb, 1998: viii) , created by formative experiences in the life of the individual. Unlike history, memory refuses Òto keep the past in the past, to draw the line, as it were, that is constitutive of the modern enterprise of historiographyÓ (Spiegel, 2002: 162) .
Despite these conceptual differences, history and memory are difficult to separate in practice. The study of history can change an individualÕs remembrance, just as the personal experiences of historians affect their academic work. Communal understandings of the past can even cause individuals to remember events they never actually witnessed. Although memory is experienced as coming Òfrom within,Ó it can also be implanted Òfrom without.Ó
The difficulties involved in separating memory from history highlight the close interaction between personal and collective memory. While individuals interpret raw experiences and give them meaning, society as a whole provides the frameworks that allow individuals to construct and maintain their identities. Arendt (1998: 181) describes the process through which persons situate themselves as a Òweb of relationships and enacted storiesÓ that bind the community together, while also enabling individuals to differentiate themselves from each other.
Maurice Halbwachs, a student of ƒmile Durkheim, developed the paradigm of collective memory (mŽmoire collective) in the aftermath of the Great War. Based on his observations of interwar Europe, he concludes that individual memories are inseparable from the frameworks of collective remembrance. Halbwachs (1925: 404) argues that personal identities are socially rediscovered (retrouvŽe) and socially reconstructed (reconstruite).
Social frameworks not only give meaning to individual memories; they also provide the broad historical imaginary that shapes the selection and interpretation of formative events.
As a result of the interplay between individuals and society, similar processes occur at both levels. Just as modernity has pushed individuals to take responsibility for past selves by constructing coherent life histories, it has also demanded that communities incorporate the past into their collective identities. In modern nation-states, it is no longer enough for the people to merely obey. Citizens also have to maintain a collective identity that enables them to act as coauthors of law.
As experienced by human beings, historical processes are marked by a distinct temporality. Unlike linear time, memory does not take equal account of events happening at regular intervals. Instead it endows certain events with meaning while silencing or forgetting others. In contrast to positivistic approaches, remembrance emphasizes the importance of certain events that shape the perception of numerical facts. Crucial events, which Òunfol [d] within an irreversible linear time, [are] absorbed into cyclical, liturgical memoryÓ (Spiegel, 2002: 152) 
The Power of Memory
Social power can be divided into at least two basic categories. The first is rooted in the ability of actors to achieve their ends despite the resistance of others. This kind of Òpower toÓ may be described as effective or strategic. The second focuses on power as a constructive force that defines an actor or group in a social setting. Unlike effective power, which is an instrument that agents possess and deploy, this form of Òpower withÓ is constructive or communicative; it is part of who they are (Saar, 2010: 9-12 ).
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What I call Òtype 1 powerÓ dominates empirical approaches. In the words of Max Weber (1978: 53) , it is defined by the likelihood that an agent can effect action within a social 9 relationship Òregardless of the basis on which this probability rests.Ó Weber applied this notion to the sphere of politics through the concept of rule (Herrschaft), which he defines as Òthe probability that a command with a given specific content will be obeyed by a given group of specific persons.Ó Although he mentions traditional and charismatic sources of authority, in modernity effective power is expressed through legal-rational institutions, where superiors are defined by their authority over subordinates (Weber, 1958: 295-301 ).
Weber did not live to see how the new regimes of the interwar years would combine administration with the strategic power of a charismatic leader to create totalitarian political regimes. In the aftermath of this experience, the Frankfurt School criticized conceptions of power that legitimized such forms of domination (Beherrschung). They did so by placing the individual at the center of a critical theory of society, arguing that Òaiming for enlightenment is essentiallyÉ [a] turn toward the subjectÓ (Adorno, 1986: 128) .
Arendt drew on the past to theorize an account of constructive or Òtype 2 powerÓ in my terminology. Arendt develops an ontological account of the power of individuals Òacting in concert.Ó By acting in social settings, she contends that Òmen show who they are, reveal actively their unique personal identitiesÓ (1998: 179) . This constructive account of power differs from effective power in a number of ways. The first is in its goals or ends. Instead of looking to the external world, the action generated by type 2 power is oriented towards other human beings. In addition to specifying the characteristics and capabilities of the unique individual, it is also the source of collective identity for groups who define themselves through Òaction in concert.Ó Second, this kind of power is nonviolent and non-instrumental. It is not applied by individuals, but arises among them. Constructive power is essentially dialogical. This differentiates power, which is communicative by definition, from force and violence, both of which rely on physical coercion. Lastly, type 2 power cannot be manifested in isolation.
Appearing in the world depends on plurality, since individuals cannot assert a unique self without others to identify ourselves both with and against. Constructive power is always relational. For Arendt (1998: 200) , ÒPower is what keeps the public realm, the potential space of appearance between acting and speaking men in existence.Ó
This account leads to a narrative model of Òidentity in action,Ó where individuals identify who they are as a result of what they say and do. Words are linked to deeds, as the account of any action requires the identification of a doer with intentions acting in a certain
context. In addition to creating unique individuals, this process also identifies communities through narratives of collective action. Within these webs of intersecting narratives, coherent understandings of self and group identity depend on the ability to integrate various stories from different perspectives into meaningful historical accounts (Benhabib, 2003: 261) .
Constructive power is futile without memory. Speech and deeds leave nothing behind.
The experience of action must be secured by Òthe saving power of remembrance, which helps us preserve what would otherwise be lost to timeÓ (Beiner, 1982: 155) . Great words and deeds, such as PericlesÕ Funeral Oration or the heroic deeds of Achilles, would have been lost but for the human capacity for remembrance. ÒWithout remembranceÉthe living activities of action, speech, and thought would lose their reality at the end of each process and disappear as though they never had beenÓ (Arendt, 1998: 95) . Memory is needed to sustain the constructive power of individuals and unique human beings within self-consciously defined communities.
Preserving Memory in the World
Memory is not the most reliable source of social influence. The fleeting nature of words and deeds gives constructive power a tragic quality, which Arendt (1998: 181) calls Òthe frailty of human affairs.Ó In order to be viable in the longue durŽe, memory and the narratives that sustain it must be encased within more permanent structures.
11
The fragility of constructive power defines the distinction between communicative and cultural memory (Assmann et al., 1983: 284) . While both are socially mediated forms of collective remembrance, communicative memory depends on repeated retelling. Because oral traditions are difficult to maintain, especially when the stories run counter to dominant social narratives, communicative memory has a limited temporal horizon. By contrast, cultural memory has been bound to objects or practices, such as memorials, written texts or social practices. The transition between communicative and cultural memory is a two-stage process:
ÒThe whole factual world of human affairs depends for its reality and its continued existence, first, upon the presence of others who have seen and heard and will remember, and, second, on the transformation of the intangible into the tangibility of thingsÓ (Arendt, 1998: 95) .
Whereas communicative memory participates only in the first step, cultural memory passes through both. The action remembered is no longer merely a product of the mind but has been reified into an artifact or performance in the world of human affairs. Individuals
Òfabricate a memoryÓ (Arendt, 1977b: 64) to help them define their collective identity through collective symbols, sites and practices. Unlike the shifting horizon of communicative memory, the fateful events and objects of cultural memory are fixed in the historical timeline of a community.
The preservation of the past is the essential function of the polity. The political community fabricates memory in a variety of ways, including Òthe mundane apparatus of bibliographical structureÓ (Waldron, 2000: 208) represented by governmental archives, serials and anthologies. Both legal and institutional regimes, as well as social norms and traditions, help to legitimize the polity by linking political authority to the action of the citizens in concert. As Halbwachs (1980: 296) This link is often drawn through legal regimes. From the narrow perspective of type 1 power, positive law sets the boundaries of acceptable behavior, making living together possible. By ensuring the safety of its members, the political community guarantees that witnesses will be present to testify to action. Each generation modifies and adds to the existing structure of law through historically established and legitimized practices. Law is not only a creation of the present, but also of the past. Arendt (1998: 198) 
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The crucial role played by a shared conception of the past in the consolidation of the nation-state can be seen in the growing prestige and political importance of history. With the awakening of national communities, historians helped to forge the bonds of solidarity that would unify the ethnic nation with the political state, the national ethnos with the civic demos (White, 1973: 170-5) . Along with cultural, literary and political actors they were able to create a mythic past that bound individuals who spoke different dialects, lived different lifestyles and had little in common together through a broadly-shared collective identity built on the past.
Social norms and traditions are a second mechanism for preserving the fleeting power of collective action. At its most basic level, tradition represents that which is passed on from generation to generation. Adorno (1966: 63) points out this usually occurs within the family, which socializes individuals into practices at a young age, becoming part of what he calls
Òunconscious memoryÓ (unbewu §te Erinnerung).
In addition to helping individuals form stable identities and connecting them to the other members of their community, tradition links them to their ancestors and to posterity by giving the community a vertical, temporal dimension to go with the horizontal, social dimension.
The polity unifies individuals not only with their contemporaries, but also with past and future members of the community. In this way, Ò[T]he history of each of our own lives is generally and characteristically embedded in and made intelligible in terms of the larger and longer histories of a number of traditionsÓ (MacIntyre, 1981: 222) .
Unleashing the Critical Power of Memory
Maintaining a connection to the past through legal and institutional regimes, as well as social norms and traditions, is crucial to individual and group identity. However, this relationship is also potentially dangerous. While memory helps to create frameworks of reference, it can also act as a roadblock, limiting freedom of thought and of action. Adorno 14 (1998: 315) was particularly concerned by this dilemma in the aftermath of the Second World War, observing, ÒNo timely tradition exists to be summoned, but if all tradition is lost, then the march into inhumanity begins.Ó Adorno (1986: 124) responds to this problem by advocating for a Òworking through of the pastÓ (Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit), instead of the Òempty, cold forgettingÓ that defined years immediately following the war in Germany. Although Aufarbeitung is usually rendered as Òcoming to terms with,Ó I prefer the translation Òworking throughÓ because it highlights the psychoanalytic connotations of this phrase. Adorno argues that Germans must bring to consciousness and actively deal with their memories of the gas chambers at Auschwitz, in order to avoid the repression that he believes damaged the social fabric of the early Federal Republic. Although he (1986: 115) notes that Germans Òwan[t] to be free of the past: rightly so,Ó it is impossible to simply evade these experiences, since they are Òstill so intensely alive.Ó The Òloss of historyÓ involved in repression has practical consequences for a newly democratic community that cannot recall its progenitors without suffering neurosis. It also has important ethical consequences: ÒThe murdered are to be cheated even out of the one thing that our powerlessness can grant them: remembranceÓ (1986: 117).
As a result of these reflections, Adorno (1998: 318) In this vision, ruptures are necessarily violent. In clashing together, the past and the future destroy narrative, leaving only fragments of the past behind. While this frees individuals and communities from teleological philosophies of history, it also breaks the webs of narrative that had supported their conscious self-understandings. Benjamin (1977: 262) notes that revolutionary moments make Òthe continuum of history explodeÓ by developing new calendars and highlighting new moments as meaningful for the present.
Arendt used these reflections to develop a historiography that saves the human capacity for spontaneous initiative from mechanistic conceptions of causation (1978: 195-213) . She argues that traumatic events have the potential to tear tradition asunder, creating a gap between past and future. This creates a hiatus between the Òno-moreÓ and the Ònot-yet,Ó when thinkers and actors have the opportunity to set the foundations of a new world. Arendt (1977a: 51) [É] The recherche du temps perdu becomes a vehicle of future liberationÓ (Marcuse, 1955: 24ff) . Despite the horrors of the past, hope for the future exists because of the faculty of human imagination.
Once unleashed, the ability to imagine a different future can help individuals create new forms of politics. Marcuse (1964: 101-2) A rupture must be widely recognized as such if it is to break apart existing narratives, opening a new, critical perspective on society. It should also exhibit both of the characteristics of rupture I have identified above. The events that create this caesura between past and future must enter their collective memory as a single break. The rupture must become part of collective memory, presenting the past to communities as a task, as a call for change.
In order to have this effect, the experience of rupture cannot be seen as the product of the exogenous force of nature. 3 Individuals and the communities are unlikely to consider making fundamental changes to collective narratives in response to events over which they believe they have no control. By contrast, if traumatic experiences are seen as emanating from within the structure of a community, then they can be interpreted as necessitating a fundamental rethinking of the meaning of the past for the future.
The interpretation of traumatic events as a historical rupture is often contested. This raises the question of agency. While everyone in a society can accept or reject a new historical interpretation, not all individuals have equal influence. Political leaders and cultural elites can take advantage of their access to mass media and the institutions of the state Ð such as the school system Ð to shape societal viewpoints by channeling type 2 power (Shain, 2010: 13) .
The role of Òmemory entrepreneursÓ (Jelin et al., 2003: 33-6 ) is important in the process of constructing new stories out of the scattered shards that remain after a historical rupture.
Political leaders and other elites can act as agenda setters, advocates, inventors of innovative policy options and deal brokers. This is especially true of individuals who come to power by interpreting traumatic events as a historical rupture (Smith, 2003: 35) . Because these events have destroyed the Òwebs of narrativeÓ that individuals and the community as a whole had previously depended on, such leaders are free to reassemble the fragments of the past into new narratives.
19
This perspective is not intended to demean the agency of the people. Political leaders and other cultural elites are always constrained by what narratives the people will accept (Benhabib, 2002: 102) . If their understanding of the past fails to resonate, new agents telling different stories will come to the fore. This gives elites a strong interest in listening and responding to narratives that their constituents find to be meaningful.
The need for traumatic events to be interpreted as a rupture, not an exogenous shock, can be illustrated by examining the differing reactions to the events of the two World Wars on the continent. As Jay Winter (2006: 49) returned to the Òtime-honored core of international diplomacyÓ (Winter, 2006: 49) .
In contrast to the return to tradition of the interwar years, World War II is a historical rupture. The Second World War was not merely a repeat of the horrors of the Great War. It brought not only destruction on a far greater scale, but also the industrial production of death at the Nazi extermination camps. Narratives glorifying the nationÕs exploits became stale (Frei, 2008: 81) . The old traditions linking experience and expectation had been pulled apart.
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A new generation of political leaders, including Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer, Alcide
De Gasperi and Henri Spaak Ð who were all born within a few years of each other Ð came to power and were able to implement new ideas based on the interpretation of the past as a historical break.
The fact that such a break must be shared and interpreted Òin concertÓ (Arendt, 1998) highlights the importance of historical generations. On a basic level, the members of generational cohort can be defined by the fact that they share Òforms of knowledge [that] become available to us only as a result of certain historical experiencesÓ (Benhabib, 2002: 135) . Although generations are never in full agreement regarding their interpretation of the past, they are defined by their search for an answer to questions that arise from the authentic experiences that defined their lives.
The difficulty in defining generations emanates from the fact that they must account for both the objective and subjective dimensions of experience. In trying to understand the generational dynamics of Weimar Germany, Karl Mannheim developed a framework that seeks to bridge this divide by focusing on how and why generational experiences arise in the first place. On one hand, he (1952: 291) argues that the temporal and spatial location of birth is an objective fact, which predisposes individuals to Òa certain characteristic mode of thought and experience, and a characteristic type of historical action.Ó On the other hand, these social factors do not guarantee the formation of a selfconscious generation. The objective experiences of a generation only become salient after they have been actively thematized. In other words, generations become aware of themselves when events shake them out of their received categories of interpretation. This destabilization forces them to search for new categories that can help them make sense of the new circumstances in which they find themselves. These Òfundamental integrative attitudes and formative principlesÓ (Mannheim, 1952: 305) efforts to federate the European nationsÓ (see Verovšek, 2014b) . Despite her critiques of technology and the increasingly economic focus of politics in modernity, in 1958 she described Europe as Òa totally god forsaken place except for the presence of the Coal and Steel CommunityÓ (quoted in Kohler and Saner, 1993: 351) .
Regardless of these different interpretations of what needed to be done, all of these thinkers saw the events of the Second World War as constituting a historical rupture.
Subsequent political developments, especially the widening and deepening of the European Union, have followed the prescriptions of Arendt more closely than the wholesale rejection of modernity presented by Horkheimer and Adorno (Verovšek, 2015) . The extent to which these changes in political life have addressed the social pathologies that led to the horrific events of emphasize the personal import of the latter over the mere occurrence of the former.
2 Other concepts of power also exist, including a Gramscian notion that structures the symbolic and material field on which actors operate and a Foucaultian understanding that permeates human action and knowledge. However, given my focus on political interactions, I
set these aside here.
3 I thank a reviewer from this journal for highlighting this point.
